Hawaiian 




Annexation 



AND 



(Texas Admitted — not ''Annexed") 



S&n Domingfo. 



LIKE REASONS OFFERED FOR BOTH. 



We Hold the Sack-Hawaii will get llie Chestnuts. 




Hawaiian ''Annexation'' 

ANO THE 

San Domingo Scheme. 



These two proposed "annexation" schemes — although over 
a quarter of a century apart in point of time, present striking 
characteristics. Almost the identical arguments used to 
force the annexation of Dominica through Congress are now 
advanced by the Hawaiian ''Sugar Trust" in the case of 
Hawaii. 

A cursory glance at the rejection of the San Domingo treaty 
possesses unusual interest just now. A treaty to '-annex" 
Dominica had failed in the Senate in 1869, but President 
Grant held to his views tenaciously, as he was wont to do on 
all occasions, and he urged the Dominica scheme with a great 
deal offeree and energy in 1870, putting the desirability of 
its annexation on the very grounds which the Hawaiian 
'Sugar Trust' now advances to support its job; to wit — 
" that the best interests of this country, commercially and 
" materially demanded its ratification that the 

"government of San Domingo had voluntarily sought annex- 
" ation ; that it was a weak power, numbering probably less 
'•'than 120,000 (Hawaii has only 109,000) and yet possessing 
" one of the richest territories under the sun ; * ^ * j-]^^^ 
" the people were not capable of maintaining themselves in 
" their (then) present condition and must look for outside 
"support; that they yearned for the protection of our free 
"institutions and laws; that its acquisition was desirable 
" because of its geographical position, commanding the en- 
" trance to the Caribbean Sea and the (Nicaragua) isthmus 
" transit of commerce ; ^ ^ that in case of foreign war 
"' it would give us command of all the islands referred to, and 
" thus prevent an enemy from ever again possessing himself 

of a rendezvous on our coast ; ^ ^ * that San Domingo 
" would become a large consumer of our products," and finally 
that " its acquisition was a measure of natio7ial protection.^' 

There were several points in favor of the annexation of San 
Domingo, not possessed by the Hawaiian scheme, and espe- 



2 



cially that it lay so near our coast that no material addition to 
our navy would be necessary. Besides it lay in the track of all 
our commerce going South ; its area was 28,000 square miles 
— equal to Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont and 
Rhode Island, as against an area of only 6,640 miles in the 
entire Hawaiian group, volcanoes, lava beds and all! The 
population of the two about the same, 120,000, as against 109,- 
000 in Hawaii. To read the reasons presented in favor of 
San Domingo annexation and those now presented to force 
the Hawaiian treaty through, one would think the crafty 
"sugar trust" in Honolulu had stolen the San Domingo ideas 
and reasons bodily, and put them forth as original I 

After the San Domingo treaty had been rejected, and on the 
9th of December, 1870 (41st Congress, 3d session), Senator 
O. P. Morton, of Indiana, offered a joint resolution that was 
debated, amended in the House and finally adopted (pp. 183, 
191 and 67), for the appointment of three commissioners by 
the President to proceed to San Domingo to inquire, ascer- 
tain and report — 

1. The political state and condition of the Republic of 
Dominica. 

2. The desire and disposition of the people of the said Re- 
public to become annexed to the United States. 

3. The physical, mental and moral condition oi the people^ 
their general condition as to material wealth and industrial 
capacity. 

4. The resources of the country, its agricultural and mineral 
products, its waters, forests, soil and extent thereof for culti- 
vation, climate and health, bays, rivers and harbors. 

5. Its debt and obligations, funded and unfunded, admitted 
and in dispute. 

6. Its treaties with foreign powers. 

7. Extent of its grants and concessions of every kind (see 
Cong. Globe, 41st, 3d, p. 53.) The debate called out the 
David Hatch-Babcock Senate Report No. 234 (4TSt, 2d), in 
which Gen. Babcock seems to have been acquittted of interfer- 
ence in San Domingo affairs by vote in Special Committee of 
4 to 3. The resolution passed December 21. Mr. Sherman 
did not vote for the annexation of Dominica (p. 194). Thur- 
man spoke against the power to admit foreign territory as a 
territory ; claiming that it must come in as a state if a joint 
resolution was resorted to (pp. 193, 250). That he said was 
the ground on which the Texas joint resolution went (see also 
remarks of Mr. Davis, p. 195). Mr. Morrill and Mr. Edmunds 
also opposed the annexation of Dominica (p. 197). 

The House amended the resolution by attaching a proviso 



3 



to the effect that nothing in it should be construed to commit 
Congress to " annexation." The Commission made a report^ 
and in transmitting it to Congress President Grant, among 
other things, said — * * * ''My task is finished, and with it 
''ends all personal solicitude on the subject. My duty being 
" done, yours begins, and I gladly hand over the whole matter 
" to the American people. ^ ^ ^ 

Neither the Senate, the House, nor the American people 
would accept the " scheme," and it fell by the wayside ; and 
yet, compared with the Hawaiian job of annexing islands 
2,100 miles away, of far less extent and value, and for com- 
mercial defense, it was far preferable — on all the grounds pre- 
sented, than is the "annexation" of Hawaii. 

There were several features surrounding the San Domingo 
project which have a bearing upon Hawaiian annexation. 
The recognized ruler of San Domingo, Baez, was — it was 
alleged, being maintained in power by our naval forces. (Cong. 
Globe, 41st, 3d, pp. 228-387.) The Hawaiian oligarchy 
could not have existed until now without an annexation treaty 
pending and the moral force which our warships have given 
it in Honolulu ! Baez was confronted by Cabral just as the 
oligarchy is confronted by the people. The trouble in San 
Domingo was, and in Hawaii is, internal^ not external ; the 
people against the oligarchy. 

Cabral was out of power, opposing Baez, just as the people 
are objecting to the oligarchy in Hawaii. Cabral had the 
people behind him, just as the queen or princess probably 
would have, if there was no interference, and this latter 
fact was made a prominent feature in the San Domingo dis- 
cussion. Our war ships, the Yantic and Nantasket, had been 
in the harbor of San Domingo holding Baez in his seat by 
the moral force of their presence, just as our war ships at 
Honolulu have been holding the Hawaiian oligarchy in 
power. When that oligarchy began to see ghosts and tremble, 
the pending "annexation" treaty was hurriedly signed — as a 
diplomatic stratagem, because so long as it is pending the law 
of nations probably is that the status quo must be preserved ! 
This whole Hawaiian "scheme" is replete with tricks and 
newspaper solvents. 

One of the " stock " arguments used to annex San Domingo 
was, that if the United States did not annex that Island, some 
other government would ; precisely the same old wormy chest- 
nut that is being roasted for the American people by the 
Hawaiian "sugar trust." (See Cong. Globe, 41st, 3d, pp. 
6-265.) 

There was a very i?npDrtant provision or article in the pro- 



4 



posed San Domingo annexation treaty which is noi found in 
. the Hawaiian treaty. Article 4 of the Dominican treaty 
/ provided that — The people of the Dominican republic shall, 
^ in the shortest possible time, express in a manner conform- 
i able to their laws, their will concerning the cession herein 
provided for; and the United Sid^tts, tmlil such expression 
shall be had, shall protect the Dominican republic against 
I ^'foreign interposHion in order that the naiional expression shall 
\ befree,'' (Appendix, Cong. Globe, 42d, ist, p. 43.) And that 
^ was also true in the case of Texas. (5 Stat, at Large, 797.) 
The explanation made of the presence of our war ships in 
the harbor of San Domingo was, that they were there to see 
that there was a fair expression or vote of the people on the 
question of "annexation." In this essential and important 
aspect the two cases are radically different. There is no pur- 
pose to submit ''annexation" to a vote of the people in 
Hawaii, but there should be, provided there is serious intent 
to force this job through. 

On former occasions there never was a proposition on the 
part of the United States to accept a cession of the Hawaiian 
Islands without the consent of the people interested. When, in 
1854, a cession was contemplated, Secretary Marcy said — 

" I understand that the measure proposed by the people, and 
''that in which the present rulers are disposed to concur, is 
"'annexation,' as distinguished from protection'" 

(See House Ex. Doc. i. Part i, p. 122 ; 53d Cong., 3d.) 

Mr. Seward, in 1867 — in referring to Hawaiian reciprocity 
and "annexation," refers to the supposed wish of the people. 
(See same Doc, p. 143.) 

And ex- President Johnson, in alluding to the same subject 
in 1868, was evidently looking for the voice of the people in 
Hawaii; their voluntary application, and not the desire of a 
mere oligarchy. (See same Doc, p. 146.) 

In the case of California, Brig. Gen'l Riley as Provisional 
Governor called a convention to meet at Monterey September 
I, 1849, to frame a constitution. All free citizens 21 years of age 
actual residents, also all Mexican residents who had chosen 10 
remain, and all who had rendered assistance in our war with 
Mexico were allowed to vote. There was no test oath. 

The organic law of the Territory of Oregon as reformed 
July 26, 1845, provided for a provisional government under 
the joint occupancy of both England and the United States, and 
was composed of the subjects of both, and the oath of office 
held the person taking it to a support of the organic laws, 
only so far as consistent with his duties as a subject of either 



5 



power. Men were not disfranchised or excluded by test oaths 
as in Hawaii. 

The friends of the Hawaiian treaty frankly concede that it 
cannot command the requisite two-thirds vote in the Senate, 
which means of course that the Executive " scheme " has met 
with defeat, to lessen the effect of which it is said to be pro- 
posed to go through the farce of talking upon the treaty behind 
closed doors until such time as resort shall be made to the 
unconstitutional legislative subterfuge of a joint resolution to 
force this Hawaiian job through by a majority vote in either 
branch of Congress ! This is doubtless humiliating, but de- 
feat, even on that line, stares the advocates of this measure 
in the face. There is no ground on which it can be made a 
party measure and the objections to the scheme are so numer- 
ous and well grounded that an effort to coerce men would be 
exceedingly dangerous. 

Texas Admitted — not "Annexed". -^-^--^ 
The theory seems to be that Texas furnishes a precedent for 

action under joint resolution. This is a mistake. In fact 

nothing could be further from the truth ! 
T. Texas was never "annexed." 

2. She came in as a State and was not admitted as Territory. 
There was no "annexation " of Texas as contradistinguished 
from her adinission into the Union as a State. So that Texas 
is no precedent whatever for a resort to a joint resolution ! The 
proposition is stated by the New York Sun as follows — 

"More than half a century ago Texas, which, as having 
"been an independent republic, forms the closest parallel to 
"Hawaii among all our annexations, was admitted to the 
"Union by joint resolution." 

The Sun should have said — Admitted into the Union as a 
State by joint resolution. 

The tenor of its remark is that because Texas was admitted 
into the Union by joint resolution as a State, that therefore 
Congress may annex'" foreign territory — as territory, by 
joint resolution ! The Constitution provides that Congress l 
may ad7}iit new States, but there is no provision whatever — out- 
side ireaty-T[\z.\img power for the acquisition (i. e., annexation) 
of territory as territory by joint resolution. This distinction 
is not only obvious but contains the fundamental objection to 
the scheme which it is said is about to be adopted by the 
friends of the Hawaiian "Sugar Trust" in the Senate. The 
trouble with the "joint resolution" scheme is that so forci- 
bly stated by Senator Thurman at the 3d session of the 41st 
Congress, when Dominica was under consideration. He said — 

"You cannot by wint resolution annex San Domingo as a 



6 



territory ; you must annex her as a State if you annex her by 
joint resolution. There is no clause in the Constitution that 
provides for the acquisition of territory by joint resolution^ 
unless it be that Congress may d;^;^//" new iS'/i?/^^; * * * 
No one has ever pretended that we could, by joint resolution, 
''annex territory as a territory without admitting it as a 
"Stated (Cong. Globe, 3d, 41st, pp. 183, 193.) 

No one will pretend that Senator Thurman was not a pro- 
found lawyer, nor given to inattention nor error where grave 
constitutional questions were involved. There is not only 
no precedent in all our history for " annexing" territory as 
territory by joint resolution, but our precedents are all the 
other way ! Louisiana, Florida and Alaska were obtained 
under the treaty-making power and Texas was admitted as a 
State, not ''annexed" by joint resolution, under express 
power given Congress to admit new States. The question of 
the power of Congress to "annex" territory by joint resolu- 
tion was exhaustively discussed in the case of Texas, and we 
will state so much of the proceedings as will show just what 
was done. 

Without going into the efforts made to obtain Texas beyond 
the 2d session of the 28th Congress, it will be sufficient to 
state that during that Congress and session and on December 

11, 1844, Senator Benton offered a bill to provide for the 
annexation of Texas, which was then an independent repub- 
lic. Mr. Benton's bill authorized the President to open 
negotiations with Mexico and Texas for the adjustment of 
boundaries and for the annexation of Texas on this basis, 
to wit : 

I. Fixing its boundary. 
/ 2. The people of Texas by a legislative act or by any authen- 
1/ tic act which shows the will of the majority to express their 
\ assent to annexation. 

3. The State to be called Texas to be admitted into the Union 
as a State. 

7. Other details of the annexation to be adjusted by treaty. 
(See Cong. Globe, p. 19; 2d, 28th.) 

The next day Mr. Ingersoll, from Foreign Affairs in the 
House, reported a resolution providing that the annexation 
and union of Texas take effect — as had been settled upon April 

12, 1843. The 8th Article attached to Mr. Ingersoll's reso- 
lution shows that what had been agreed to on the 12th of 
April, 1843, ^ treaty, which our Senate had rejected. (See 
Cong. Globe, ist, 28th, p. 662.) 

During the ist session of that (28th) Congress, President 
Tyler had said, in a message — "While I have regarded the 



7 



annexation to be accomplished by treaty, as the most suit- 
" able form in which it could be effected, should Congress 
*^deem it proper to resort to any other expedient compatible 
*^ with the Constitution, and likely to accomplish the object, I 

stand prepared to yield my most prompt and active co-oper- 
"ation." (Cong. Globe, ist, 28th, pp. 662-3.). 

In other words, the question involved was, Could the United 
States acquire foreign territory as territory except by treaty? 
In the case of Texas, it was finally decided that Congress — 
under expressed constitutional power, could reach the desired 
result by admitting her as a State, and it was done. The 
Hawaiian proposition is to acquire or annex foreign territory 
as territory by joint resolution. As Juds^e Thurman, when 
speaking of San Domingo, well said — there is no clause in 
"the Constitution of the United States that provides for the 
^^acquisition of territory by joint resolution of Congress, 
"unless it be one single provision, and that is that the Con- 
" gress u\2iy admit viQTf States into the Union. It was upon 
"the argument that there was no limitation upon that power 
" to admit new States into the Union ; that it was not limited 
"to territory belonging to the United States, but that terri- t 
" tory belonging to a foreign power might be admitted into | 

the Union as it was upon that doctrir e that the | 

"resolution in the case of Texas was passed. But no one has I 

ever prete^ided that you could by joint resolution annex ter- | 
" ritory as a territory without admitting it as a Stated (See/ 
Cong. Globe, ist, 43d, pp. 183, 193.) 

Speaking at the same time. Senator Davis, of Kentucky, 
(p. 195), stated that Secretary Calhoun had negotiated by 
treaty for the annexation of Texas and that the Senate had 
rejected it, and that thereafter a joint resolution was intro- 
duced to " annex " Texas as a State of the Union, not z.^ a ter- 
ritory, and that the only power that was relied upon to author- 
thorize Congress to admit Texas was that single provision of 
the Constitution which authorizes Congress to admit States 
into this Union. 

The legislative and statutory facts in regard to what is 
erroneously\.txm^A the annexation " of Texas — if it is meant 
thereby to contradistinguish "annexation" from admitttng 
her as a State, are as follows. During the ist session of the 
28th Congress President Tyler sent in a special message con- 
cerning Texas. At the second session we find Senator Benton 
offering the bill and resolves, to which allusion has been 
made, Mr. Ingersoll offering his resolution from Foreign 
Affairs in the House. December 23, 1844, Mr. Douglas in the 
House offered a joint resolution for the /-^-annexation of 



8 

Texas, in conformity with ihe treaty of 1803 of the Louisiana 
Purchase. (Cong. Globe, p. 65.) This went on the ground 
that Texas was in fact a part of the United States and that 
she had never belonged to Spain. This resolution was 
modified by Boyd's (p. 171) and again by Owens (p. 189). 

Mr. Weller, of Ohio, on the same day offered joint resolu- 
tions to annex Texas as a territory (p. 49). At least seven 
other bills or resolutions were offered. (Jan. 3, 1845, ^d, 
28th; Ingersoll's resolutions were taken up; p. 84.) 

Weller moved to substitute his own and Mr. Douglas moved 
to amend Weller's motion by substituting his resolutions, and 
very considerable debate ensued until January 28, when Mr. 
Brown's resolution, in form somewhat like that of Mr. Doug- 
las' as amended — was adopted (pp. 192, 193, 194); all others 
being rejected. It was slightly amended in the Senate which 
the House concurred in and it became a law as it stands. It 
certainly was not a joint resolution annexing TexdiS as territory. 
In brief, by joint resolution of March i, 1845, Congress pre- 
scribed for Texas certain conditions — on compliance with 
which, she would be admitted into the Union as a State. 
These resolutions may have been (erroneously) called "annexa- 
tion " resolutions, but they were conditions which she was at 
liberty to reject or accept. She was an independent republic ; 
had achieved her independence after eight years or more of 
severe fighting. Her State convention met July 4, 1845, 
consider the conditions prescreibed in the resolutions and it 
did not adjourn until August 27, 1845. ^3^^ Octo- 

ber following the people xz.X\^qA the constitution proposed by 
her convention and accepted the conditions, and she was ad- 
mitted into the Union in December 29, 1845, ^ State. 
There was no " annexation " in any sense other than her ad- 
mission. (5 Stat, at Large, 797 — Cong. Globe, 41st, 3d, pp. 
195; 9 Stat, at Large, 108.) 

Those in favor of the Texas resolutions, which simply looked 
to the admission of Texas as a State, grounded themselves upon 
the clause giving Congress the express power — in so many 
words, to admit new States into the Uni' n. 

Mr. Choate disclaimed that his speech in executive session 
in the summer of 1844 favored the '^annexation" resolutions. 
(Cong. Globe, 2d, 28th, p. 304 ) 

In fact he denied that either Congress or the /r^iz/y-mak- 
ing power had a right to absorb, acquire or admit foreign 
nations into our Union. He said— " It was not until \\ was 

found that the treaty of last session had no chance of passing 

the Senate, no human being, save one — no man, woman or 
''child in this Union, or out of the Union, wise or foolish, 



drunk or sober, was ever heard to breath one syllable about 
" this power in the constitution of admitting new States being 
''applicable to the admission of foreign nations (Texas being 
''an independent foreign nation), governments or States. 
" With one exception, till ten months ago no such doctrine 
"was ever heard of or even entertained. The exception to 
" which he alluded was the letter of Mr. Macon to Mr. Jeffer- 
" son which Mr. Jefferson so promptly rebuked that the in- 
" sinuation was never again repeated till it was found neces- 
"sary ten months ago by some one — he would not say with 
" Texas scrip in his pocket, but certainly with Texas annexa- 
" tion very much at heart, brought it forward into new life, 
" and urged it as the only proper mode of exercising an ex- 
" press grant of the Constitution." He insisted that the joint 
resolution was gotten up — " not from any well-founded faith 
"in its orthodoxy, but for the mere purpose of carrying a 
" measure by a bare majoriiy of Congress that could not be car- 
" ried by a two-thirds majority of the Senate in accordance with 
" //z^ /r^^z^y-making power." (Cong. Globe, 2d, 28th, p. 304.) 

Senator Merrick also made a very able speech against the 
resolutions, taking the ground that we could acquire territory 
(unless by conquest or discovery) solely under the treaty- 
making power and he cited several precedents. (See p. 279, 
280 Mr. Rives spoke to the same effect (p. 292). 

Something has been said about Henry Clay's position on 
this or a kindred question in 1820. The facts are these : 

On the 3d of April, 1820, at the ist session of the i6th 
Congress, Mr. Clay offered two resolutions which had a bear- 
ing on the power of Congress — as against the treaty making 
power. (Annals ist, i6th, p. 1719 ) His pertinent resolution 
was to the effect that Congress has the power to alienate ox to 
dispose of the territory of the United States and that no 
treaty alienating or disposing of our territory is valid without 
the consent of Congress. 

It related to the proposition in a treaty with Spain to give 
up Texas for Florida, etc. Mr. Lowndes, p. 1736 7, took the 
ground that the House — under some circumstances, might 
have some power in regard to treaties for the cession or acquisi- 
tion of territory, but whatever that power was, the just view 
of the Constitution was that it was a restraining and not a 
directing power. Any other idea he said might entirely de- 
stroy the /r^^z/v making power. 

It will be observed from the Constitution that there is ma- 
terial reason why Congress might have some power over the 
alienation oi territory and not\\2,vQ any power whatever over its 
acquisition by annexation — as against the treaty -vs\2<Y\Vi<g power, 



lO 

because we have an express grant of power to Congress — to 
dispose oi the territory of the United States." (But see Rhea's 
interpretation of this, p 1777.) 

In fact it was upon //^i?/ ground that the Texas Resolution 
passed in 1845, as stated by Judge Thurman, 

The Clay resolution seems never to have been voted upon, 
but the fact that Texas was alienated or disposed of for Florida 
by the treaty-vcizk\x\g power in 1819, and the precedents, show 
that the disposal and the acquisition of territory as territory 
must be by treaty. There was no argument advanced on the 
Clay resolution, denying to the tre aty -mdiking power the so/e 
power to acquire or annex territory. The struggle in 1845 in 
the House — amending the resolutions plainly shows that the 
final struggle was to get some resolution perfected in such 
form that it would command a majority vote, and the friends 
of the measure fell back on the Brown resolution, which was 
simply one indicating to Texas what she must do and on what 
conditions Congress would admit her as a State. In that form 
the resolution passed 120 to 98, and in the Senate 27 to 25. 

The New York Sun says that — ''under Thomas Jefferson, 
''the Father of Democracy as it once was, our country an- 
" nexed Louisiana and the great Northwest; that under James 
"Monroe we annexed Florida; that under John Tyler we 
" annexed Texas ; that under James K. Polk we annexed Cal- 

ifornia and New Mexico, while under Andrew Johnson we 
' annexed Alaska." 

That journal is not treating the subject-matter with the 
candor that usually marks its course. Louisiana was annexed 
by treaty; so was Florida; Texas was admitted as a State and 
there was no "annexation" independently of that action. 
California was acquired by war, and Alaska by treaty. 

The joint resolution of March i, 1845 (see 5 Stat, at Large, 
p. 797) provided — "That Congress doth consent that the terri- 
" tory properly included within and rightfully belonging to 
" the republic of Texas, fnay be erected into a State to be called 
" the State of Texas, with a republican form of governmei2t, to be 
" adopted by the people of said republic, by deputies in con- 
" vention assembled, with the consent of the existing govern- 
" ment, in order that the same {i e., the State) may be admitted 
" as one of the States of this Union." 

Then followed certain conditions, and then it was provided 
that if the President should deem it most advisable, instead 
of submitting the aforesaid resolutions to Texas, then that a 
State to be formed out of Texas be admitted as soon as terms, 
etc., could be agreed upon. By joint resolution of December 
29, 1845, Texas was admitted diS a State. (9 Stat, at Large, p. 
108.) 



And from that resolution it clearly appears that Texas had 
proceeded to act under the first proposition of the resolution 
of March i, 1845. It is improper therefore to speak of Texas 
as having been " annexed " — in any sense other than that of 
her adfjiission as one of States of the Union. The proposi- 
tion in regard to Hawaii is to acquire or annex foreign terri- 
tory as territory by joint resolution ! A very different matter. 

WHAT WOULD WE GET UNDER "ANNEXATION"? 

Individuals seldom enter into contracts without seriously 
considering ivhat the ??iutical advantage will probably be. 
Neither should nations make annexation " treaties without 
counting the ^t^jj/ and relative advantages. In the case of the 
Hawaiian treaty the latter would clearly seem to be all on 
one side — in favor of the Hawaiian ''Sugar Trust," for there 
is little or nothing but sugar in the Islands worthy of considera- 
tion. To accept a cession of the Islands upoa mere senti?nent 
would be unworthy of an American Congress. The air may 
be very conducive to indolence and some of the soil very fer- 
tile to conceive sugar profits, but the United States can 
hardly afford to take upon themselves burdens, give away 
^8,000,000 of revenue yearly, and extend support and mainte- 
nance for dry air, lava-beds, individual "gear" and — poi. 
We have the trade of the islands now — as we always have had 
and will continue to have. The lines of commerce are selfish 
and they insure us the small Island trade. We can readily 
protect our Pacific Ocean commerce from Pearl River harbor. 
In fact it was never in peril or we would long since have 
dredged out the entrance to that harbor for the entry of war 
and other vessels. 

What then does this Hawaiian treaty propose to give us 
for '' annexation " ? 

1. Hawaii proposes to cede all her sovereignty^^ in and 
over the Islands. Sovereignty is not always desirable. It 
may entail debt and responsibility out of all proportion with 
the real value of that commodity, and in this case our tax- 
payers will be almost certain to wake up to that fact when 
we are asked to support and maintain the Islands and when 
cable and naval contracts and forts and fortifications get 
under way. 

2. Hawaii proposes to cede and transfer to the United 
States all the public, government and crown lands, public 
buildings, harbors, etc. That sounds well. But there is a 
string to all that. Our land laws are not to apply ; special 
laws are to govern their disposition, so that we would not 
advise any one to get the Hawaiian land fever, and for 



12 



additional reasons to be stated. Nor is the revenue from 
these remnants of lands to go into our treasury ; it is to go 
into the Hawaiian treasury ! Let nobody assume that large 
tracts of land will be open to settlement under " annexation " ! 
To understand the land situation in Hawaiian lands, it isn't 
necessary to go back farther than the year 1847, when there 
was a fairly well-defined division of all the lands in the 
Hawaiian Islands. 

In pursuance of that division the king, in 1848, set over 
the larger part of his lands to the ''government" and 
reserved the residue for himself, his heirs and successors. 
This was ratified by an act. 

In 1850 the chiefs set over a one-third of their lands to the 
government to get full title to the remainder of their share 
under the division agreed on. 

The king dealt with his lands as his private property, sell- 
ing, leasing and mortgaging the same, and conveying good 
titles. 

The Supreme Court of Hawaii held, however, that the 
inheritance to the "crown" or king's lands was limited to 
his successors to the throne, but that he could regulate and 
dispose of the same as his private property. This was so until 
1884. In that year, by act of the legislature, the "crown" 
lands were made inalienable, nor leasable beyond a period of 
thirty years. 

We cannot confiscate lands, except for treason, and the 
queen and her successors are not guilty of treason. So that 
a very serious question would probably arise ; the United 
States might be honorably called upon to pay handsomely for 
them to obtain a good title. About 94,000 acres only of 
crown lands are now available for lease, of which 47,000 only 
are of much account. The sugar planters have all ike rest ! 
(See House Ex. Doc. 1, Part i, pp. 603, 667, 553 ) 

Most of the "government" land consists of mere remnants 
left here and there, worthless and unsalable. (See same 
Doc, 603.) 

So that the treaty pretense of a cession of lands, aside from 
"sovereignty" over them, is as thin as air, independently of 
the fact that any revenues derivable from them are to go into 
the Hawaiian, and not into our treasury. 

3. And then it is proposed by this crafty Hawaiian "Sugar 
Trust" that their "free and easy " tariff laws j/za// rm^3!/« 
until we enact other legislation ! That will allow their sugar 
planters to get in their goods cheap ; while " annexation " will 
at once compel the United States to shoulder their $4,000,000 
debt and interest, maintain and support the government and 
protect the Islands, what do we get? 



13 



Nothing but debt, responsibility and sovereignty ! And 
worse than all, " annexation " would ivithdraiv from us forever 
our power to levy any duty on Hawaiian sugar and rice, worth — 
as has been stated, at least ^8,000,000 a year ! This tender 
of these Hawaiian Islands reminds us of the division of the 
turkey and crow which the white man proposed to the Indian. 
The Hawaiian planters say to the United States, "You take 
" the crow and I'll take the turkey, or I'll take the turkey and 

you take the crow !" There is nothing in "annexation" for 
the United States but crow. 

When the Hawaiian oligarchy began to discover why and 
how our general laws might affect the Islands, and the " sugar 
trust " in Honolulu, it set its literary bureau at work to 
mould sentiment in the United States and make it ready for 
j-^^^r/iz/ legislation in favor of the Hawaiian planters ! 

One of the serious questions to arise will be that which 
concerns the commerce between Hawaii and the United 
States. 

A material part of this traffic is at present conducted by 
means of British steamers plying between Hong-Kong, Yoko- 
hama, touching at Honolulu and San Francisco. Under 
existing United States laws such, traffic would be cut off 
by the annexation of these islands. Trade between Honolulu 
and the coast will have become American coasting trade, 
and must be conducted exclusively by American vessels. 
Neither freight nor passengers could then be carried by Brit- 
ish steamers. It is very doubtful whether those ships would 
call at Honolulu if deprived of the large eastern half of their 
business — that between Honolulu and San Francisco. 

The result is that these crafty Hawaiians are likely to ask 
our Congress for some specific legislation to permit traffic to 
be continued for a time upon foreign steamships between 
Yokohama and Honolulu. And they may even suggest that 
it would be wise to go farther than this and to entirely exempt 
Hawaii from the application of the United States coasting 
laws. 

In other words, this oligarchy is simply driving a bargain 
with the United States in which all the burdens shall be thrown 
upon our taxpayers, while the Hawaiian "sugar trust" is to 
be allowed to reap the benefits I 

" Kamehameha," who has long been the literary support 
of the Hawaiian "sugar trust" in Honolulu, admits in a 
letter to the Washington organ of the Hawaiian " sugar 
trust" (August 10, 1897), that the islands contain 1,000 
lepers; that there were 10,000 persons entitled to the elective 
franchise at the last election, but that only 2,500 voted be- 



14 



cause of the application of the disqualifying iesi oath, and he 
likewise confessed that a majority of the voters " are hostile 
■to the oligarchy ; that two-fifths or 8,835 of the total number 
of laborers on the sugar plantations are " contract," of which 
number 6.602 were Japanese. And he likewise conceded that 
— " annexation would call for fortifications at Honolulu," 
but he thought — a very few millions would suffice " ! 

The Hawaiian Islands have managed, under our continuous 
policy that guaranteed their independence, not only to main- 
tain that independence for half a century, but they have got 
along without forts and fortifications — which is the highest 
type of civilization, and we have kept at home our ''very 
few " millions that would otherwise have been expended. 

An effort has been made to "pad" the figures of exports and 
imports to and from Hawaii, to make up a case of important 
trade relations. Outside of the San Francisco Board of Trade 
there isn't a city in the United States that feels conscious of 
any commercial advantage from Hawaii ; the trade is too 
small. Consul Ellis, in 1896, in House Doc. 323, 54th, 2d, 
gives Hawaiian exports and imports, but his figures and 
tables fail to show how much of the exports to Hawaii from 
the United States are domestic. A comparison of his figures 
with the domestic exports to the Island found in House Doc. 
426, 54th, ist, plainly indicates that in 1895 nearly 36 per 
cent of the imports into Hawaii — as given by Mr. Ellis, 
were foreign ! x4.s our (domestic) exports to Hawaii are care- 
fully given by items in House Doc. 426, they can hardly be 
controverted. Hence, in considering the figures and per- 
centages of imports into Hawaii from Mr. Ellis, which we 
will present, due allowance must be made for this fact, that 
from 35 to 40 per cent are foreign. From his report we take 
these figures — 

1894, Exports from Hawaii ^9,140,794, of which 

sugar ^8,473,609 

Imports into Hawaii, ^5,713,181. 

1895, Exports from Hawaii, ^8,474,138, of which 

si^gar 7.975^590 

" Imports into Hawaii, ^5,714,617. 

1896, Exports from Hawaii, ^15,5 15,530, of which 

sugar 14,932,172 

" Imports into Hawaii, $7,164,561." 

Without annexation the United States got 99 per cent of 
Hawaii's exports in 1895 and 1896, and 98^ per cent in 

1897, They have nowhere ehe to go — advantageously. So 
there is no danger of losing Hawaii's petty trade, for outside 
of sugar it is of no account. 



^5 



The average imports into the Islands from the United 
States during 1894-1895 was 77^^ per cent of the total, our 
Pacific ports shipping 72 of the 77^, which accounts for 
Hawaiian sentiment in San Francisco, but, as we have 
cautioned our readers, from 35 to 40 per cent of the ioiat 
import trade into Hawaii was foreign products although 
shipped through the United States. And while the above 
figures would seem to show a material gain, the fact is that in 
1889 and 1890 Hawaii's exports averaged only ^2,000,000 
less than in 1896, and her imports were even larger in 1891 
than in 1896. (See House Doc, 323, p. 1014, 54th, 2d.) 

From the same document (p. ion) we find this interesting 
condition of things existing — 

1896, Imports into Hawaii paying duty ^1,741,385 

" " free of duty 3,225,659 

free by civil code 1,845,096 

Which shows that nearly 75 per cent of Hawaii's imports are 
free of duty ! There are some features in this policy which 
tend— in connection with other things, to lighten up this 
whole annexation " affair, showing it to be a dollar-and- 
cent scheme. The sugar trust " in Hawaii — through its 
legislature recently raised the duty on Japanese saki from 15 
to 60 cents a gallon, placing that burden on the poorer or 
laboring classes, and then to curry favor" with the San 
Francisco Board of Trade they let in " free" of duty Cali- 
fornia wines — drunk by the planters! So too the sugar plant- 
ers get their coal and coke, their fertilizers, bone-meal 
and most of their machinery in "free" of duty. With such 
tactics and with ''free" sugar to the United States, it is no 
wonder that the Hawaiian '' Sugar Trust" wants annexation ! 
Nor is it any wonder that a few men in San Francisco favor 
the scheme. 

A prominent writer favorable to ''annexation" indulged 
last April in a backslap at Senator Frye, and in doing so 
unconsciously exposed one reason perhaps why the proposed 
Pearl Harbor appropriation did not meet with the success 
that it may have been promised. 

The explanation is easy. If Congress had made that appro- 
priation, those who have property to be made " valuable " by 
its expenditure, might grow cold on annexation ; hence the 
, delay has operated as a stroke of policy. The idea that the 
owners of this property will " do it themselves " is like one 
of " Kameharaeha's " theories. The writer said — 

" It appears that a little appropriation of $100,000 had some 
" prospect of being made by Congress to open the bar at Pearl 
" Harbor. Senator Frye, who proposed it, is one of Hawaii's 



i6 



*'best friends and has his eyes more opened to Pacific needs 
than most of his colleagues. But even he seems to need 
more light on the subject. For the good Senator's benefit, 
and to help him push Pearl Harbor matters rather faster, I 
will mention that the owners of property in that vicinity 
have grown tired after thirteen years' waiting for the United 
"States to open the harbor and make their property valuable. 
"They have begun to perceive the worth of the old maxim, 
" ' If you want anything done, do it yourself.' There are 
"several hundred thousand dollars' worth of lands adjacent 
" to the locks of Pearl Harbor and between them, whose value 
" will be hnmensely enhanced whenever such a noble seaport is 
"opened in their midst. An important movement is rapidly 
" taking shape among those property owners to form a stock 
" company and open the bar themselves, as well as to make 
other needed improvements. It is only strange that they 
"have not moved sooner — due perhaps to tropical sluggish- 
" ness. 

" There have lately been some heavy corporations launched 
"into most successful operation in that section, which no 
" doubt have served to open the eyes of the gentlemen al- 
" luded to." 

A little information — of the right kind, often serves to re- 
veal a great " deal." In making their contest for annexation 
we hope the friends of the scheme will insist on having a plat 
of these lands printed for the use of Congress, with a list of 
the owners thereof, and whether the same are of record in 
Honolulu and from whom obtained and when, and the price 
paid ! It can do no harm, and there may be American capi- 
talists who will want to invest. If we are to annex and pay 
the Hawaiian debt, some of our taxpayers should be given a 
chance in this Hawaiian jack-pot. 

The planters know the moment Hawaii is annexed, the 
Islands become a part of the United States, and that they then 
will forever have the advantage of " free" sugar. That will 
be a free gift by the United States of ^8,000,000 per annum ! 
On the other hand, Article 3 of the treaty of annexation pro- 
vides that — until legislation shall be enacted extending the 
"United States tariff laws and regulations to the Hawaiian 
" Islands, the existing customs relations " shall apply ! That 
means that over five millions of imports into Hawaii will con- 
tinue to be " free," only ^1,741,385 paying duty — a very fine 
clause for the sugar planters, especially as our taxpayers will 
need to at once commence to pay the debt and help support 
the Hawaiian Islands, while throwing away or releasing about 
^8,000,000 of needed revenue on sugar every year ! If our 



17 



people had time to understand this matter they would never 
sanction it ! 

Our taxpayers will bear the expense of governing and pro- 
tecting the Islands, and the planters, with free sugar, Japanese 
"contract" labor and "free trade,'* will manage to get the 
chestnut. It is a gigantic scheme of robbery and spoliation, 
artfully cloaked by diluted senti??ient and specious considera- 
tions, best calculated to appeal to the commercial cupidity, 
aggressive spirit and false pride of the American people ! 
Let us undeceive ourselves in time ! Secretary Sherman 
admits that the "annexation" treaty imposes upon our Con- 
gress the determination — " of all questions affecting ih.Qform 
"of government of the annexed territory, the citizenship and 
" elective franchise of its inhabitants and the manner in which 
"the laws of the United States are to be extended to the 
" Islands." 

In all this it is easy to perceive agitation and trouble — for 
the United States, and perhaps entangling alliances, as well 
as probable loss of trade with Japan. It is needless to de- 
scribe how there is in some of our Southern States, on the 
part of the whites, a constant struggle for mastery, carried on 
under the plea of necessity, by means which ill comport with 
the principles of a republican form of government. 

All these conditions of difficulty appear in Hawaii in a far 
more dangerous proportion. Its climate is tropical, and 
political ascendency depends on force because its white peo- 
ple are preponderantly Japanese, Chinese and natives. 

Some one will argue that the fifth article of the pending 
treaty prohibits the Chinese from entering the United States 
from the Hawaiian Islands. The moment the Islands are 
annexed, they become part and parcel of the United States, 
and may we enact legislation — as against China, prohibiting 
her subjects lawfully within a State or a Territory going 
into or from one State or Territory of the United States to 
another? That would be "exceptional" legislation and of 
questionable constitutionality. Hawaii — as an independent 
government, may pretend to agree with the United States to 
this restriction, but what will be its force when once Hawaii 
becomes a Territory or State within the United States? Can 
Congress prevent a subject of a foreign nation — laivfully within 
our borders going from one State or Territory of the Union 
into another? What international complication or trade 
feeling might not an enforcement of such a provision 
engender ? 

Will not the same forces and influences in Congress that 
are now pushing this "annexation" scheme through, feel 



i8 



morally bound — if it is accomplished, to extend ihe advantages 
contained in the treaty provisions for an indefinite time — at the 
expense of our taxpayers? Can we safely look to those 
influences for fair and just legislation or for a timely appli- 
cation of our revenue or customs laws to the Islands? What 
strife do these things not promise, and all for what? With a 
contest precipitated over these matters in Congress, how long 
will the Hawaiian sugar planters be able to hold the advan- 
tage of ''free trade" practically? And how long will the 
people of the United States be asked — under one pretense or 
another, to bear the burdens that Hawaiian annexation " 
will impose upon them? It isn't enough for us to assume the 
Hawaiian debt and give up $8,000,000 of revenue on sugar, 
annually, but other burdens are to be added, and serious 
troubles are promised ! 

Great Britain, Germany and the United States became in- 
terested in the independence or neutrality of Samoa in 1889, 
just as our policy has been to preserve the neutrality or inde- 
pendence of Hawaii to which England and France agreed in 
1843 and to which we assented. Why should the United 
States risk trade or foreign entanglements with Japan or any 
other nation over this Hawaiian ''sugar trust" scheme of an- 
nexation, when the independence oi tho. Islands is assured, and 
when there is not only no necessity but many disadvantages 
in deserting our policy of ''benevolent neutrality." Our 
harbor of Pagopago in Samoa is — "a deep land-locked basin 
"of easy approach and perfectly secure anchorage," just as that 
of Pearl River harbor in Oahu could be made at small ex- 
pense. That is all that is either needful, advantageous or 
necessary. With those harbors the United States is fully pre- 
pared to meet all encroachments, to resist attack, to protect 
our commerce and the neutrality of the Islands. Let it rest 
at that as it has for half a century, safe and secure ! 

As if time hung heavily on his hands, and perhaps looking 
forward to a reappointment, Mr. Procter, of the Civil Service 
" Trust," has essayed to build up — in his mind's eye, an enor- 
mous Pacific commerce, and thereupon he asks how we are to 
protect it — without Hawaii ! We have long sent 80 per cent 
of our commerce over the Atlantic to Europe without an Island 
in that ocean to protect it, and we have only 5 per cent now 
going westward over the Pacific ! We hope the President will 
note the fact that Mr. Procter is in line with his policy on 
Hawaii. It may become important — to Mr. Procter. 

The conservative sentiment of this country sees great im- 
mediate danger in opening the door of "annexation." The 
ingo sentiment may be seeking a new policy ; it mayventurie 



19 



far enough to e ndanger the Monroe doctrine and bring down 
upon this country serious trouble and enormous expense. 
That the " annexation " naicrobe is ravaging the body politic 
is evident from the following dispatch — 

"Boston, Nov. 9. — Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, in a 
" speech last night, openly expressed his hostility to the schefne 
''to amiex Cuba to the United States, but announced his 
''intention of supporting the annexation of Hawaii. 

"Senator Lodge strongly advocated buying and annexing 
" the Danish West Indies.'' 

Poor Cuba I An island whose independence would be of 
more value than a thousand Hawaiis '. An island rich in re- 
sources, lying in the pathway of our Southern commerce. If 
the colonial policy is to be foisted upon the United States, 
it ought to be signalized with some bettei' effort than Hawaii. 

During the discussion of the Wilson tariff bill in 1894, we 
find Senator Morgan saying this of Hawaii and of annexation — 

" If I were an Hawaiian / never would claim anexatton to the 
" L'nited States — never/ I would make Hawaii the Switzer- 
" land in the Pacific Ocean that Switzerland is in Europe, 
'•'■protected by all the nations of the earth, perfectly able to take 

care of herself under all circumstances and the heaviest popula- 
" iion that can go there " — 

Was the Senator indulging in fancy, then, or is he dream- 
ing now ? 



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